



APPOSITION AND AFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION IN HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Tiwari Anoop Kumar & Sharma Kirti

Faculty of Department of Humanities and Social Science, National Institute of Technology Raipur Chhattisgarh.

ABSTRACT

This piece of writing hubs on the symbolic effects of structures that involve the apposition of two (or more) sections with similar, but not identical, explanations – for example, he felt depressed, flattened. Building on existing relevance theoretic accounts of communicative effects, it aims to show how these structures can be used to communicate an impression of emphasis or intensification that can be compared with the effects achieved by repetitions. It argues that these effects are not achieved in the same way, and that three different cases can be distinguished. First, the use of this structure may lie in the way it encourages the reader to explore the differences between the interpretation of the second segment and the interpretation of the first. Second, it may encourage the reader to explore the total set of contextual assumptions made accessible by both (or all) segments for the derivation of an interpretation that cannot be derived from any one segment alone. Finally, the article considers the use of these structures by authors who use free indirect style to represent a character's struggle to identify an emotion s/he is experiencing.

KEYWORDS: Emphasis; Ineffability; Free Indirect Thought/Style; Reformulation; Repetition; Weak Communication.

INTRODUCTION

The phenomena that are discussed in this article have been taken from literature as they are easy to quote. In human resource management oral communication plays a more vital role than the written documentation. At first sight, they might seem to be examples of reformulation, since they involve the apposition of two segments with similar interpretations. Consider, for example, (1)–(5):

- (1) He felt *depressed, flattened*. (SEU w.1.16.6.239–40, cited by Meyer, 1992: 67)
- (2) He *made a complete mental retreat; went far away*. (Maurice Gee, *In My Father's Den*, 2004[1972]: 171)
- (3) I feel I stand accused, also, by your actions, of having loved you at all, *as though my love for you was an act of brutal forcing, as though I were a heartless ravisher out of some trumpery Romance, from whom you had to flee, despoiled and ruined*. (A.S. Byatt, *Possession*, 1991[1990]: 456)
- (4) In the beginning it was *a tension, an element of strain that grew and crept like a thin worm through the harmony of their embrace*. (Keri Hulme, *Bone People*, 1985[1984]: 6)
- (5) For in marriage *a little licence, a little independence* there must be between people living together. (Virginia Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 1976[1925]: 9) However, when the second segment is introduced by a marker of reformulation such as *or, in other words, or that is*, the result is, if not unacceptable, different in interpretation. Consider, for example:
- (6) He felt depressed, or, in other words, flattened.

- (7) In the beginning it was a tension, that is, an element of strain that grew and crept like a thin worm through the harmony of their embrace.

Moreover, it seems that in contrast with sequences that contain reformulation markers, the sequences I have in mind can consist of more than two apposed segments:

- (8) She has a curious feeling as she stands there, as though something is out of place, *a wrongness somewhere, an uneasiness, an overwatching*. (Hulme, 1985[1984]: 16)
- (9) That was the way to live – *carelessly, recklessly, spending oneself*. He got to his feet and began to wade towards the shore, pressing his toes into the firm, wrinkled sand. *To take things easy, not to fight against the ebb and flow of life*, but to give way to it – that was what was needed. To live – to live! (Katherine Mansfield, 'At the Bay', 1981[1945]: 209)

If, as I argue, there is no unitary notion of reformulation, the fact that expressions such as *or, in other words* and *that is* are inappropriate in (1)–(5) and (8)–(9) might be taken to mean that they are examples of a particular sub-type of reformulation. In unplanned discourse (or planned discourse that is mimicking unplanned discourse) saying something in one way and then in another could be the result of the sort of revision and correction that characterizes utterances that are produced 'on the trot'. However, in this article, I shall be focusing on these sequences as they occur in planned (predominantly written) discourse, where their use can be said to be the result of a deliberate stylistic choice.³ In fact, I have argued that the classification and sub-classification of reformulation relations does not provide an explanatory account of the interpretation of utterances such as those in (10)–(14) (Blakemore, 2007). In any case, the examples in

(1)–(5) and (8)–(9) achieve effects that cannot be explained by classifying them as reformulations. In particular, it seems that in examples such as (1)–(3) and (9), the communicator may express the same thought in two (or more) different ways in order to achieve an emphatic sort of effect which could be compared with the effect of repetitions such as (10)–(16):

(10) I'm depressed, depressed.

(11) He went far far away.

The emphatic effects of repetition are non-propositional effects that are lost under paraphrase and are worked out differently in different examples. The effects of examples such as (1)–(3) and (9) are also difficult to paraphrase. Moreover, it is not clear that they are recovered in the same way in each case, or even that we would want to describe them all in terms of *emphasis*. Thus in (1) the effect is one of intensification or amplification that can be attributed to the fact that *flattened* can be understood to communicate a more serious form of depression than *depressed*. However, the words used in the second segment of (2) would not be said to communicate a greater degree of mental retreat from that communicated by the words used in the first segment. Here the effect is more an impression of heightened vividness that is somehow derived from the combination of the two segments. In this article, I refer to the communication of such impressions, or non-propositional effects as 'affective communication'.

The fact that these sequences involve affective communication and communicate non-paraphraseable impressions rather than particular assumptions means that they raise a question raised by any stylistic device that is used for rhetorical effect (including repetition): how do we accommodate anything as vague as an impression in a theory of utterance interpretation that is based on a representational or computational theory of the mind? In this article, I show that the emphatic effects of utterances such as (1)–(3) and (9) can be explained in terms of the relevance theoretic notion of *weak communication* (Sperber and Wilson, 1995[1987]: 59–60). At the same time, I shall explain how utterances of this form may give rise either to an impression of intensification or to an impression of heightened vividness, and why both these types of effect are different from the effects yielded by repetitions.

It will have been observed that whereas in (1)–(3) the communicator will be understood to be communicating one of his own thoughts about a state of affairs, in (9) Mansfield will be understood to be representing the thoughts of someone else (in this case, a fictional character) – it is an example of free indirect style or thought.⁴ Following Sperber and Wilson (1995[1987]), I shall use the term *descriptive* to refer to those acts of communication in which communicators use an utterance to represent their own thoughts about a state of affairs, and the term *attributive* to refer to those cases in which communicators use an utterance to represent the thoughts of another person.⁵

This distinction brings an extra dimension to the discussion of the emphatic effects of these structures. For whereas in (1)–(3) the decision to produce two segments with closely related interpretations is the consequence of the

communicator's belief that this is the best way of expressing his (own) thoughts about a state of affairs for the purpose of communicating them, in (9) it will be understood to reflect the way in which the person whose thoughts are being represented is thinking about a state of affairs. In other words, it seems that whatever is being represented by utterances of this form must itself be seen as part of what is being attributed to the character whose thoughts are being represented. But this raises the question of exactly what is being attributed. For it seems that intensity or emphasis cannot be regarded as a conceptual constituent of a thought (in the way that the concept communicated by, say, *carelessly* is).

The same question is raised by the repetition *To live – to live!* in (9), or the use of emphatic stress in the following (constructed) example (from Blakemore, 2002):

(12) John pointed out that they couldn't really afford a holiday. But no, she said that she NEEDED to get away.

Here, however, I shall focus on the question of what the italicized sequences in (8) and (9) are intended to represent. According to the relevance theoretic framework of this article, we should approach this question in exactly the same way as we approach the question of what they represent in examples of ordinary descriptive use. Even if Mansfield's character were not fictional, Mansfield would have no way of knowing what his thoughts look like or how closely her representations of those thoughts resemble them. In particular, there is no justification for thinking that the thoughts being represented actually contain a sequence of constituents corresponding to the ones I have italicized. By the same token, however, there is no way of knowing how closely the interpretation recovered resembles the thoughts represented. Not only is there a gap between utterances and their interpretations that is bridged by contextual inference, but also there can be no guarantee that the assumptions recovered by an audience are identical with the thoughts that the communicator wanted to communicate. Whether a communicator is communicating his/her own thoughts about a state of affairs or his/her representations of someone else's thoughts, the aim is not to duplicate these thoughts but to provide an interpretation. In ordinary descriptive uses of language, this interpretation contributes to the sense of mutuality between the communicator and audience. In cases of free indirect style or attributive uses of language, it contributes to the sense of mutuality between a character and the audience. The point is that this is, as Sperber and Wilson (1995[1987]: 224) put it, 'affective' rather than cognitive mutuality. And the question is how such affective mutuality is achieved.⁶ However, it is not clear that the apposition of alternative formulations is always used to communicate an impression of intensification or heightened vividness. In (8), it might seem that the author is simply aiming to capture the difficulty she is experiencing in expressing the concept she is trying to communicate, or in other words, that she is simply aiming to capture its very ineffability. However, what the author is representing here is not one of her own thoughts, but the thoughts of another person (in this case a fictional character). This means that she will not be

understood to be communicating the difficulty. she is having in expressing her own thought (in a public language), but rather the difficulty that someone else (a character) is having in representing the thought to herself (privately). It is not Keri Hulme who is represented as grappling with her feelings in (8), but the character whose feelings Hulme is representing. This raises the question of whether this character is actually having an imprecise thought, or whether she is better described as not being able to conceptualize her experience under an existing concept. In this article, I shall leave the question of what it would mean for someone to have a thought that they cannot represent to themselves, and focus on the question of whether the fact that Keri Hulme's character is represented as grappling with her feelings in (8) means that any attempt to represent them is self-defeating. If someone is struggling to identify the emotion they are experiencing, how could anyone else hope to represent it? In the following section, I shall outline the relevance-theoretic framework that will underlie the discussion of the way in which the sequences I have identified are used in both the descriptive use of language and in free indirect style, focusing on the relevance-theoretic approach to the relationship between language and thought, the difference between the descriptive and interpretive dimensions of language use, and the notion of weak implicature. In section 3, I consider the ways in which the apposition of alternative formulations give rise to emphatic effects, and in the final section I consider the possibility that a sequence of alternative formulations may be used to capture the difficulty of identifying the concept being communicated.

RELEVANCE, INFERENCE AND INTERPRETATION

Linguistic meaning and communicated meaning

The relevance-theoretic framework that underlies this article makes three fundamental theoretical assumptions. First, verbal communication is a matter of producing a linguistic 'clue' from which the audience can construct a representation of the thought or thoughts the communicator is trying to communicate. Second, the construction of this representation involves inferential pragmatic processes that are constrained by the assumption that the communicator has aimed at OPTIMAL RELEVANCE (see Sperber and Wilson, 1995[1987]).⁷ Finally, the representation that the audience derives through these processes should not be seen as a copy or literal representation of the communicator's thought, but as an interpretation of it – that is, as a representation that resembles the communicator's thought in virtue of sharing its logical and contextual implications. This thought, as Sperber and Wilson have shown, is itself relevant either in virtue of being a description of a state of affairs or in virtue of representing a further thought. I shall be looking at this distinction in more detail later. My concern in this subsection is with the relationship between the linguistic clue provided by a communicator and the thought that it is used to communicate.

In order to satisfy the expectation of optimal relevance raised by an utterance, the audience must, on the one hand, use contextual assumptions to develop its encoded linguistic meaning into an appropriately explicit propositional content

(an EXPLICATURE), and, on the other, use contextual assumptions that are made accessible by the conceptual content of this explicature for the derivation of COGNITIVE EFFECTS. These two operations do not take place serially, but are, as Carston (2002) puts it 'mutual adjustment' processes with hypotheses about context, explicit content and cognitive effects being made, adjusted and confirmed in parallel on-line (see Carston, 2002; Wilson and Sperber, 2004; Sperber and Wilson, 1995[1987], 1998[1997]). The inferential mutual adjustment processes involved in the derivation of explicit content not only allow the audience to disambiguate any ambiguous material and to assign reference to referring expressions, but also allow them to enrich and modify the encoded meanings of expressions for the recovery of communicated concepts that may be either narrower or broader than the one from which they are derived. For example, the concept encoded by a word such as *depressed* can be regarded as a very general concept, or concept schema, that will be interpreted in specific ways in order to meet the expectations of relevance raised by particular utterances. Compare, for example, the different uses of *depressed* in the following:

(13)[Ruby, Bob and Sue have just watched the England football team lose a match]

Ruby: Is Sue coming for a drink?

Bob: She's depressed.

(14) Ruby: I didn't see Sam at the party.

Bob: He hasn't been able to get a job since he was made redundant last year and he's very depressed.

For example, in the interpretation of (13), Ruby will not only use contextual assumptions made accessible by her own utterance, but will also draw on her assumptions about the feelings that may be aroused about football in order to derive a specific ad-hoc concept DEPRESSED* which has the sort of encyclopaedic content that will allow her to interpret Bob's utterance as an answer to her question. Similarly, in (19), Ruby will use the contextual assumptions made accessible by Bob's utterance together with her own assumptions about redundancy and unemployment to derive a different ad-hoc concept DEPRESSED**, which has the sort of encyclopaedic content that will allow her to interpret Bob's utterance as an explanation for Sam's absence at the party.⁸ In some cases, the linguistically encoded meaning of a word may undergo a process of concept broadening so that it communicates a concept that would be taken to depart from the literal meaning it encodes. Consider, for example, the loose use of *empty* in (15) (from Wilson and Carston, 2006) and the metaphorical use of *flattened* in (16):

(15) You should take your *empty* bottles for recycling.

(16) Being made redundant has been a terrible experience and I am totally *flattened*.

Although the word *empty* has a sense in which the bottles contain nothing at all, in (15) it will be understood to communicate a broadened concept (EMPTY*) whose extension includes bottles that contain small amounts of wine or the water in which they were washed. The concept recovered from *flattened* in (16) will be understood to have undergone a more radical process of broadening, for here it will be taken to communicate a concept (FLATTENED*)

that includes properties that have nothing to do with the encoded concept at all: the implicatures that the audience recovers are not the sort of implicatures that one would derive from assumptions about the physical properties of a surface, but are derived from assumptions about being in need of rest, or being emotionally exhausted, which somehow emerge when the encoded meaning of *flattened* is interpreted in the context of the assumptions made accessible by the earlier part of the utterance.⁹

Weak implicature and affective communication

As we have seen, the audience's interpretation of *depressed* in (13) and (14) is constrained by the need to derive a concept that allows them to interpret the utterance as a response to Ruby's utterance. In contrast, the responsibility for bringing contextual assumptions to bear on the interpretation of *depressed* in (17) is given to the audience:

(17) Ruby to Bob: I saw Sam today. He seemed rather depressed.

As in (13) and (14), the encoded meaning of *depressed* is too general to yield an interpretation that would make Ruby's utterance sufficiently relevant to Bob. On the other hand, it is not clear that the implicatures that Bob recovers are necessarily the ones that Ruby intended. For example, he might recover any of the implicatures in (18):

(18) Ruby is worried about Sam.

Ruby believes that I should go and see Sam.

Sam hasn't recovered from being made unemployed.

Ruby thinks that Sam needs help.

Sam was not very talkative.

Sperber and Wilson (1995[1987]) call these implicatures WEAK IMPLICATURES, implicatures that the audience is encouraged to derive, but for which they have to take some of the responsibility (for further discussion, see Sperber and Wilson, 1995[1987], Chapter 4). However, such implicatures have to be inferentially warranted, and it is clear that the derivation of the ad-hoc concept from the encoded meaning of *depressed* plays an essential part in this. As Carston (2002) has pointed out, this means that an ad-hoc concept may be weakly communicated in the same way as an implicature may be. The relationship between the concept recovered by the audience and the one that the communicator has in mind is not one of identity but one of resemblance, where resemblance is determined by the extent to which the two concepts give rise to the same logical and contextual implications. Clearly, there is no way of *looking* at the two concepts and checking whether they resemble each other: the audience can only go ahead and recover the interpretation that satisfies their expectations of optimal relevance. Strength of communication is a matter of degree, and will vary according to the amount of responsibility the audience is given for the interpretation of the utterance in question. Thus even in cases such as (13)–(14), where the audience is constrained by their aim of recovering an interpretation which is optimally relevant in the context made accessible by the preceding utterance, they are given some degree of responsibility. For example, Bob's answer in (13) is neither equivalent to 'Sue is too depressed to go for a

drink' nor to 'Sue is depressed about England losing the football'. Bob's concept of the sort of depression that results from seeing a football team beaten may not be the same as Ruby's. Moreover, they may not have the same concept of the sort of depression which rules out going for a drink. Accordingly, the implicatures derived by Ruby may not be identical to the ones that the communicator had in mind, and (18) has an indeterminacy not shared by utterances such as 'Sue is too depressed to go for a drink' or 'Sue is depressed about losing the football'.

Similarly, the strength of the implicatures derived from a metaphor will vary depending on the extent to which its interpretation calls upon the imagination of the audience. Thus the interpretation of the metaphor in (16), which is not a particularly creative one, will not require a great deal of imagination, and the communicator can be regarded as providing some degree of endorsement for the implicatures recovered. In contrast, the interpretation of a creative or unusual metaphor will require a great deal of imagination on the part of an audience, and the communicator's endorsement of its implicated content will be considerably weaker. However, neither metaphor can be paraphrased without loss of meaning. That is, even in the mundane example, it will be assumed that the communicator has a specific thought in mind, and that the decision to produce a metaphorical utterance is constrained by the aim of finding the optimally relevant means of representing it.¹⁰

The picture of communication that is emerging here is not one in which communicative success depends on the duplication of thoughts, but is one in which communication results in what Sperber and Wilson (1995[1987]) describe as the enlargement of mutual cognitive environments (p. 193). On this view, an utterance is simply (public) evidence for a (private) thought, and the interpretation recovered by a hearer can only be an interpretation of the thought communicated. Communication will succeed to the extent that the optimally relevant interpretation of the utterance achieves the sort of 'loose' coordination that, as Sperber and Wilson say is 'best compared to the coordination between people taking a stroll together rather than that between people marching in step' (1998[1997]: 123). Thus, for example, in communicating the thought that Sam is depressed, the communicator in (17) can only assume that the audience's search for relevance will yield a concept that resembles it sufficiently for it to play a role in the (loose) coordination of their behaviour. In fact, it is not always the case that what is recovered from an utterance corresponds to a conceptual constituent of the communicator's thought. Consider, for example, the emphatic effects of repetitions such as the ones in (19) (from Sperber and Wilson, 1995[1987]: 219):

(19) (a) We went for a long, long walk.

(b) I shall never, never smoke again.

(c) My childhood days are gone, gone.

As Sperber and Wilson (1995[1987]) have shown, the emphatic effects of repetition are not always achieved in the same way. Thus in (19(a)), the repetition achieves extra cognitive effects by modifying the propositional form of the utterance and the communicator will be understood to be communicating that the walk was longer than one might

expect. In (19(b)), the effect is to strengthen the communicator's degree of commitment to the proposition expressed. However, the effect in (19(c)) cannot be analyzed in either of these ways: the communicator is not suggesting that his childhood days are more gone than one might have thought or that he is more strongly committed to the proposition that his childhood is gone than one might have thought.

According to Sperber and Wilson (1995[1987]), the interpretation of (19(c)) can be accounted for by assuming that the repetition is an encouragement to expand the context that has been made accessible by the repeated word, and in this way to derive a range of cognitive effects that he would not have recovered otherwise. In this way, the communicator is able to suggest that the utterance is more relevant than the audience would have assumed otherwise. However, as they point out, the audience is not given any particular information about the way in which the context is to be expanded, or about the extent of the expansion. The responsibility for exploring the encyclopaedic entries for GONE* is given to the audience so that the resulting interpretation consists of a very wide range of weakly communicated implicatures that the audience will assume provide a faithful interpretation of the communicator's feelings. In other words, while the form of the utterance suggests a line of processing, the responsibility for the recovery of its cognitive effects is given to the audience. The result as, Sperber and Wilson say, is 'a sense of apparently affective rather than cognitive mutuality' (1995[1987]: 224).

Attributed thoughts

As it is presented in section 2.1, successful communication is achieved when a communicator produces a public representation of one of his/her thoughts about a state of affairs and the audience recovers a representation that is a sufficiently faithful interpretation of that thought. However, not all communication is like this. In some cases, a communicator may produce an utterance that communicates a thought that itself is a representation of someone else's thought – an attributed thought. In some cases, for example, (20)–(21), the fact that the communicator is communicating a representation of an attributed thought is indicated by the use of a particular linguistic form:

(20) Apparently, he has been made redundant.

(21) Bob said that the New Zealand team won.

In other cases, the hearer will have to infer that an utterance is being used to communicate an attributed thought on the basis of the context and the principle of relevance.

APPOSITION AND THE COMMUNICATION OF EMPHATIC EFFECTS

In this section, I return to the sequences in (1)–(3) (repeated below):

- (1) He felt *depressed, flattened*. (SEU w.1.16.6.239–40, cited by Meyer, 1992: 67)
- (2) He *made a complete mental retreat; went far away*. (Gee, 2004[1972]: 171)
- (3) I feel I stand accused, also, by your actions, of having loved you at all, *as though my love for you was an act of*

brutal forcing, as though I were a heartless ravisher out of some trumpery Romance, from whom you had to flee, despoiled and ruined. (Byatt, 1991[1990]: 456)

I have suggested that although the appositions in these sequences can all be said to give rise to an impression of amplification or heightened vividness, the effects achieved are not necessarily the same in each case. In particular, while there does seem to be a sense in which the second segment in (1) and (3) can be said to intensify or amplify what is communicated by the first, this does not seem to be the case in (2). Here it seems that we have to say that it is the *apposition* of the two segments that is more 'intense' than either segment taken individually.

This suggests that an account of how the apposition of expressions with closely related interpretations contributes to the impression of emphasis must contain an explanation of this contrast. Let us consider each type of case in turn before addressing the question of why the effects they yield are different from the ones associated with repetition.

Intensification

I have described the forms that are the focus of this article in terms of the apposition of segments that have similar interpretations. At the same time, however, I have described the interpretation of the second segment in each of (1) and (3) in terms of an amplification or intensification of the interpretation derived from the first. The question, then, is how two segments may be similar in interpretation but different in 'intensity'.

Let us begin with the (constructed) example in (22), where, in contrast with the examples in (1) and (3), each of the two segments involves what would normally be thought of as a non-figurative use of language:

(22) I'm leaving. You've spoilt the whole evening, ruined it.

The word *spoil* is consistent with interpretations ranging from very slight damage (a faint ink-mark on a book) to damage of a more serious sort (the loss of cover and half the pages). Moreover, whether such damage is so serious that it qualifies as ruin is a subjective matter. Nevertheless, it can be said that ruining something entails but is not entailed by spoiling it, and hence that *ruin* is informationally stronger than *spoil*. Thus we might say that the impression of intensification in (22) is created by the use of a word whose meaning is informationally stronger than the one in the first segment. And, indeed, this impression cannot be recovered from the (comparatively unacceptable) (22')

(22') I'm leaving. You've ruined the whole evening, spoilt it.

However, if the communicator had wanted to communicate the stronger concept in (22), then why did he/she not simply produce the second segment in the first place? The fact that he/she produced both may, of course, be the result of the sort of revision and correction that takes place in unplanned discourse. However, here we are interested in cases in which a communicator's decision to produce both segments is deliberate. As we have seen, the concept that the audience recovers derives from *spoil* on a

particular occasion of its use will not be the very general concept it encodes, but an ad-hoc concept SPOIL* that will give them access to a range of contextual assumptions that allow the derivation of contextual implications.

‘Hybrid’ representations

Now let us turn to the sequences in (2) and (9), where the emphatic effect does not hinge on the order in which the segments are presented: (2) He made a complete mental retreat; went far away. (Gee, 2004[1972]: 171) (9) That was the way to live – carelessly, recklessly, spending oneself. He got to his feet and began to wade towards the shore, pressing his toes into the firm, wrinkled sand. To take things easy, not to fight against the ebb and flow of life, but to give way to it – that was what was needed. To live – to live! (Mansfield, 1981[1945]: 209)

As we have seen, there is no suggestion here that the conceptual content of the second segment is stronger or more emphatic than the content of the first. Rather the point seems to be that the two segments combine for the communication of a concept that is more intense than the one communicated by either segment taken individually. For example, in (2), the author is indicating that the thought that he has in mind is neither the one which is communicated by (23(a)) nor the one communicated by (23(b)):

(23(a)) He made a complete mental retreat.

(23(b)) He went far away.

The sequence in (2) is intended as a description of someone who has been accused of a terrible crime by the narrator. The interpretation of the metaphor *a complete mental retreat* will lead the audience to derive a similarly metaphorical interpretation of *went far away* so that the character will be understood to go far away mentally rather than physically. The point is that while the audience will not derive an interpretation of physical retreat from (23(a)), they will derive a concept that will give them access to concepts such as WITHDRAW, RETIRE, REFUGE, GO BACK, which, when brought together with the concepts made accessible by MENTAL, will give access to contextual assumptions about taking refuge in one’s thoughts or memories about the past. The exploration of these assumptions will result in a range of weakly communicated assumptions that in other circumstances would be taken as an interpretation of the thought that the writer wanted to communicate. A similar kind of analysis can be given for the sequence in (24), which is extracted from the passage in (9):

(24) That was the way to live – *carelessly, recklessly, spending oneself*.

While the content of *carelessly* gives the audience access to contextual assumptions about the sort of behaviour that results from a lack of concern, attention or planning (the spontaneous behaviour that may result in (happy) accidents and co-incidences), the content of *recklessly* will give them access to a rather different set of assumptions (about taking risks, endangering oneself) and hence a different range of implicatures. The content of *spending oneself* will be inferentially adjusted so that it does not give access to assumptions about money, but rather provides the basis for accessing contextual

assumptions whose exploration yields implicatures about being lavish with one’s physical and mental resources. The use of all three of these words indicates that the range of implicatures that the audience derives through the exploration of the encyclopaedic entry for any one of the concepts they communicate is not a faithful representation of the thought the author wishes to represent. Thus the audience is encouraged to explore the contextual assumptions made accessible by *carelessly*, extend this context further by exploring the contextual assumptions made accessible by *recklessly* and then extend it further by exploring the contextual assumptions made accessible by *spending oneself*. The result is a wide array of weakly communicated implicatures that can only be derived through the exploration of the contextual assumptions that are made accessible by all three segments taken together – a hybrid representation.

As I have already observed, in contrast with (2), this is not a hybrid representation of the author’s own thoughts, but a hybrid representation of someone else’s thoughts (the thoughts of a fictional character). However, this does not affect the analysis I have presented. The point is that the interpretation recovered as an interpretation of the author’s thought is itself an interpretation of another person’s thought. This means that the resulting sense of mutuality will be between the audience and the person whose thoughts are being represented. The analyses of the examples in (2) and (9) (the hybrid representations) and the analyses of the examples in the previous section (the examples of intensification) provide the key to the explanation of why the emphatic effects they achieve are different from the emphatic effects achieved by repetitions. As we have seen (section 2.2), a repetition such as the one in (19(c)) (repeated below) achieves an effect of emphasis by encouraging the audience to expand the context that is made accessible by the content of the repeated word: (19(c)) My childhood days are gone, gone.

Thus the audience is encouraged to explore their contextual assumptions about what happens when one’s childhood has gone still further – by drawing on their own experience or their observation of the experience of others and their imagination – and expand the context in order to derive a wider array of weakly communicated implicatures than they would have otherwise.

In contrast, the impression of emphasis that an audience derives from an example such as (1) is achieved as a result of accessing the contextual assumptions made accessible by two *distinct* concepts – concepts that may be similar but are in fact crucially different. As we have seen, in encouraging the audience to identify the *difference* between the implicatures derived from each of these two concepts the communicator is able to draw attention to, and thus emphasize, the stronger concept.

The impression of emphasis that is achieved in examples such as (2) and (9) is also the result of accessing the contextual assumptions made accessible by two (or more) distinct concepts. However, in contrast with (1), the impression of emphasis derives from the fact that the context built by *combining* the contextual assumptions made

accessible by each one of the concepts yields a more vivid, striking interpretation of the thought being communicated than the context made accessible by any one of them.

APPOSITION AND INEFFABILITY

Finally in this article, I would like to turn to the example in (8), where the apposition of phrases with closely related meanings seems to capture the difficulty that someone is experiencing in identifying the feeling they are having:

(8) She has a curious feeling as she stands there, as though something is out of place, *a wrongness somewhere, an uneasiness, an overwatching*. (Hulme, 1985[1984]: 16)

Feelings are regarded as intrinsically private and unshareable, and it is not surprising that they are difficult to express. However, as we have seen, the difficulty that is being represented here is not the difficulty of representing an intrinsically private experience in a public language. Hulme is representing the difficulty that her character is having representing a feeling to herself rather than the difficulty of representing this feeling in a public language. It seems that this difficulty derives from the fact that the character is experiencing a feeling that she does not recognize: it does not fall under any one existing concept.

However, if this is the case, then isn't there something self-defeating about Hulme's attempt to represent this character's thoughts? If someone is having difficulty identifying a feeling, then how could anyone else hope to identify it? The point is, of course, that Hulme has not identified it. She has simply represented her character's ambivalence towards the identification of this feeling. Thus the feeling is not just a feeling of uneasiness, or a feeling of wrongness, or a feeling of 'overwatching' (whatever this is).¹² It is something that is in some sense like each one of these.

More particularly, the author's assumption in producing this sequence is that the concept encoded by each of the three apposed phrases will be inferentially enriched for the recovery of an ad-hoc concept that gives the audience access to a distinct range of encyclopaedic assumptions. These three contexts are taken together to yield a range of weakly communicated implicatures that could not have been derived from any one segment alone. These implicatures will not be assumed to be *identical* to the ones that are derived from the concept that the author is trying to represent: they simply amount to an *interpretation* of this concept. At the same time, the fact that the author has attempted to communicate this concept through a series of alternative linguistic clues can be taken as evidence that the character herself is finding it difficult to identify what she is experiencing. In this way, the author increases the sense of intimacy between audience and character – the sort of intimacy that derives from the belief that one is sharing essentially private experiences and feelings.

CONCLUSION

The structures that have featured in this article are ubiquitous in both literary and non-literary texts. Yet they are rarely discussed. As I have shown, the effects they

achieve are similar, but not identical to those achieved by repetitions. Like repetitions, they do not always achieve these effects in the same way. I have distinguished three different types of case. First, there are the cases in which the use of the structure encourages the audience to explore the *differences* between the interpretation of the second segment and the interpretation of the first. This results in an impression of intensification. Second, there are the cases in which the structure is used to encourage the audience to explore the total set of contextual assumptions made accessible by both (or all) segments for the derivation of an interpretation that could not be derived from any one segment alone – a 'hybrid' concept. Finally, there are those cases in which this structure is used in free indirect thought to represent a character's struggle to identify an emotion he/she is experiencing. In none of these cases can it be assumed that the interpretation recovered is identical to the one intended. As we have seen, even in cases where the audience has relatively little responsibility for the interpretation they recover, there can be no guarantee that it is identical to the one intended. Words are simply bits of evidence provided by the communicator for the identification of his/her intention. Since the use of these structures leaves so much of the responsibility for interpretation to the audience, the idea that they result in an interpretation which duplicates the one intended is even more difficult to maintain. However, as Sperber and Wilson (1995[1987]) have shown, this does not mean that the level of understanding that is achieved is not sufficient for successful communication. On the contrary, as the last section demonstrates, the fact that the use of these structures does leave the audience so much latitude in the interpretation process can result in an increased sense of empathy.

Notes

1 Apposition is generally treated as a grammatical category, rather than a stylistic or functional one. However, as Quirk et al. (1985) point out, grammarians have not applied the term consistently, and definitions vary from the very conservative to the very liberal. Thus while conservative definitions restrict the category to the juxtaposition of co-referential noun phrases, more liberal definitions have extended it so that includes the juxtaposition of a range of constructions, including parenthetical glosses, elucidations, reformulations, and corrections of the first segment. As Burton-Roberts (1993) points out, such cases would seem to suggest that apposition is a very loose type of relation, and arguably not a syntactic relation at all. Indeed, Burton-Roberts has demonstrated that the category has even been extended to include the juxtaposition of complete sentences in a discourse, in which case it would seem to become a type of coherence or textual relation. The use of the term in the present article should not be taken to suggest that I am able to offer a definition that is more precise than any found in the literature. I adopt the term simply because it has been widely adopted to refer to the juxtaposition (rather than coordination) of sub-sentential phrases 'each of which can be understood to have the same syntactic category with

respect to the same other elements in the sentence structure' (Burton-Roberts, 1993: 185).

2 The phenomenon I have in mind is exemplified here by examples from actual (mainly literary) texts or discourse. However, this is not intended to suggest that the evidence I use in support of the arguments that follow is restricted to naturally occurring examples, or, more fundamentally, that the constructed examples that are cited in these arguments are any less 'real' than naturally occurring data. Indeed, since arguments about the semantics and pragmatics of constructions depend on negative evidence (sentences that are not acceptable or that are not acceptable under a particular interpretation), constructed examples play an essential role in semantic and pragmatic argumentation. Accordingly, the arguments that follow are based on a mixture of acceptable examples from actual discourse, acceptable constructed examples and unacceptable constructed examples.

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